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INTRODUCTION 
 
HE governance of publicly-held corporations is effectuated by a number 
of public and private institutions ranging from the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) to the market for corporate control. These 
institutions vary enormously in terms of their organizational forms and 
existential motivations, but they share the common characteristic of 
contributing to the control of agency costs faced by investors in public 
companies. 
Equity investors rely on corporate governance systems. One of the most 
remarkable aspects of modern economic life is the fact that hundreds of 
millions of investors have been persuaded to part with hundreds of billions of 
dollars in exchange for residual claims on the cash flows of companies. The 
securities that represent these residual claims offer their owners virtually 
nothing in the way of formal legal protections. Shareholders do not have the 
right to repayment of their principal, ever. Companies issuing the equity 
claims have no obligation to repurchase the shares of investors, regardless of 
how well or poorly the issuing companies perform. These companies also, of 
course, are under no obligation to pay dividends or make any other sort of 
payments to equity claimants. And, while U.S. law does offer some protection 
for investors when managers and directors engage in palpable fraud or 
outright stealing, there is no judicial oversight of managerial competence, and 
virtually no review of negligence.1 
The thesis of this article is that the institutions of corporate governance 
in the United States have become politicized. Regulations have caused the 
cartelization and ossification of important institutions like the accounting 
industry and the credit rating industry. Other politically-motivated rules have 
dramatically hobbled the market for corporate control, which historically has 
been the cornerstone of corporate governance. The observation generated by 
this thesis is that the politicization of the process of corporate governance has 
produced massively perverse results. Specifically, those corporate governance 
institutions that have performed the worst have been rewarded, while those 
institutions that have performed the best have been hampered by legal rules 
designed to impede their ability to operate. Rather than producing genuine 
reform, the wave of corporate governance, accounting, and capital markets 
                                                                                                            
1.  Joseph W. Bishop Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of 
Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099 (1968) (stating that the search for 
cases in which directors have been held liable for “negligence uncomplicated by self-
dealing” is “a search for a very small number of needles in a very large haystack.”).  
T 
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scandals of the 1990s has generated political responses that benefit narrow 
interest groups and harm investors. Politics, not economics, determines which 
corporate governance devices are favored and which are not. As a 
consequence, the most effective corporate governance devices tend to be 
disfavored, while ineffective mechanisms are rewarded in the regulatory 
process. 
This article begins with a description of the major institutions of 
corporate governance, and proceeds to a discussion of how each has 
performed. These major corporate governance institutions include the 
accounting firms that audit public companies, the credit rating agencies that 
determine whether their debt is “investment grade” or not, the market for 
corporate control that disciplines management of poorly run companies, the 
organized stock exchange that promulgates corporate governance rules, the 
market for initial public offerings of company shares, and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission itself, which regulates markets, oversees corporate 
disclosure, and, increasingly, formulates corporate governance policies for 
public companies 
The story that emerges is rather depressing. The institutions that have 
performed the worst—the accounting firms, the SEC, and the credit rating 
agencies—are thriving, shielded from the consequences of their poor 
performance by a regulatory system that has rewarded poor performance. By 
contrast, the institution that has done the best and that holds the most 
promise for protecting investors—the market for corporate control—has 
been thwarted by protectionism.  
It is highly unlikely that the perverse outcomes described here are entirely 
random. Rather, these outcomes are probably the result of a series of 
unrelated individual political decisions that were made under conditions of 
crisis, in response to political pressure, or as a result simply of following the 
path of least (political) resistance. Whatever the reason for the outcomes 
catalogued here, however, one thing is clear: the consequence of this 
unfortunate series of decisions is a massive diminution in the quality of 
corporate governance.  
 
I.  THE MECHANISMS AND INSTITUTIONS OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
  
As noted at the outset, the institutions of corporate governance are 
numerous and varied. The list includes all sorts of gate-keepers, such as 
lawyers, investment bankers, and accountants, as well as corporate boards of 
directors and financial institutions, which monitor companies to which they 
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have loaned money. These institutions have two things in common. First, 
shareholders rely on the institutions of corporate governance to solve the 
problems inherent in the separation of share ownership and management of 
large public corporations. The persistent willingness of investors to purchase 
residual equity interests in firms controlled by others is an astonishing and 
distinctive feature of U.S. capital markets, which are characterized by far more 
widely dispersed ownership than other capital markets throughout the world. 
The proclivity of U.S. investors to part with their investment dollars in far-
flung ventures over which they have no practical control, and no legal rights 
to repayment of principal or to periodic returns (e.g., dividends) on their 
capital depends critically on the efficient operations of the institutions of 
corporate governance. 
 
A. Accounting Firms 
 
Accounting information related to the financial condition and financial 
performance of companies is important for a variety of reasons. As Ted 
Eisenberg and I have observed previously, in theory at least, companies in the 
capital markets demand the services of external auditors because investors 
will not invest unless they can rely on a credible signal that the financial 
results being reported by the company are accurate.2 This need is particularly 
acute in light of the strong incentives that managers have to misstate earnings 
and other indicia of financial performance:3 
 
                                                                                                            
2.  Theodore Eisenberg & Jonathan R. Macey, Was Arthur Anderson Different?  An Empirical 
Examination of Major Accounting Firm Audits of Large Clients, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
263, 266 (2004). 
3.  Thus, outside auditors do not perform any services for a company that the company does 
not already perform for itself. The role of the auditor is not to prepare financial reports 
for clients (that is the role of the accountant). Rather, the auditor’s role is to provide a 
reliable verification of the company’s financial reports. See generally Rick Antle, Auditor 
Independence, 22 J. ACCT. RES. 1 (1984); George J. Benston, The Value of the SEC’s Accounting 
Disclosure Requirements, 44 ACCT. REV. 515 (1969); Ronald R. King, Reputation Formation for 
Reliable Reporting: An Experimental Investigation, 71 ACCT. REV. 375 (1996); Norman 
Macintosh et al., Accounting as Simulacrum and Hyper-reality: Perspectives on Income and Capital, 
25 ACCT., ORGS. & SOC’Y 13 (2000); Brian W. Mayhew, Auditor Reputation  Building, 39 J. 
ACCT. RES. 599 (2001); Brian W. Mayhew, et al., The Effect of Accounting Uncertainty and 
Auditor Reputation on Auditor Objectivity, AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY, Sept. 2001 at 49; 
Ross L. Watts & Jerold L. Zimmerman, Agency Problems, Auditing, and the Theory of the Firm: 
Some Evidence, 26 J. L. & ECON. 613 (1983). 
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[A]uditors’ reputations are central to the standard 
economic theory of auditing. Only auditors with 
reputations for honesty and integrity are valuable to audit-
clients. The idea is that, absent a reputation for honesty 
and integrity, the auditor’s verification function loses its 
value. In theory, then, auditors invest heavily in creating 
and maintaining their reputations for performing honest, 
high quality audits. High quality audits by independent 
auditors who have good reputations are assured. The 
quality assurance is derived from the fact that performing 
poor-quality audits diminishes the value of the audit firm’s 
investment in reputation.4  
 
The so-called “pre-Enron” view of the accounting industry, embraced by 
the law and economics movement,5 predicted that accounting firms compete 
in a “race-to-the-top” that provides them with incentives to strive to produce 
high quality audits: 
 
There was a time that the audit function was carried 
out in a market environment that induced high quality 
financial reporting. In that era, accounting firms were 
willing to put their seal of approval on the financial 
records of a client company only if the company agreed to 
conform to the high standards imposed by the accounting 
profession. Investors trusted accountants because 
investors knew that any accounting firm that was sloppy or 
corrupt could not stay in business for long. Auditors had 
significant incentives to ‘do superior work’ because 
‘auditors with strong reputations could command a fee 
premium, and high fees ‘signaled quality in the auditing 
market.”6 
 
                                                                                                            
4.  Eisenberg & Macey, supra note 2, at 266. 
5.  Id. 
6.  Jonathan R. Macey & Hillary Sale, Observations on the Role of Commodification, Independence, and 
Governance in the Accounting Industry, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1167, 1168 (2003). 
1:10 (2006)          The Politicization of American Corporate Governance 15 
Audit firms had incentives to provide high quality audit services because 
they wanted to protect their reputation for independence and integrity.7 As 
Ted Eisenberg and I have observed previously, “[i]n a world in which 
auditors have both invested in developing high quality reputations and in 
which no single client represents more than a tiny fraction of total billings, 
high audit quality seems assured. Under these conditions, any potential gain to 
an auditor from performing a shoddy audit, much less from participating in a 
client’s fraud, would be vastly outweighed by the diminution in value to the 
auditor’s reputation.” 8  
In sum, even though companies can (and do) audit themselves, they can 
justify the expense of hiring outside auditors to enhance their financial 
reputation and credibility with a wide range of current and prospective 
claimants on their cash flows, including investors, suppliers, customers, and 
prospective employees. Under this reputational model, companies need 
independent audits to attract outside capital, because it is widely believed that 
an auditing firm that discovers a problem would insist on a correction or, 
ultimately, fire the client. Being fired by an accounting firm has serious 
implications for the client.9 In contrast, economic theory supposed that an 
accounting firm that dismisses an audit client, however, would, at worst, lose 
only that client. And even this loss probably would likely be offset as the 
accounting firm might well gain new clients by virtue of the enhancement in 
the reputation of the accounting firm that followed from firing the client.  
Thus, the “law and economics 101” approach to auditing embraced the 
view that, even though companies can and do impose their own financial 
controls and audit themselves, they hire outside auditors to capitalize on the 
audit firm’s reputation for probity. Hiring an auditor, under this theory, 
                                                                                                            
7.  Independence is measured by the percentage of an audit firm’s billings that are derived 
from a particular client. For example, Andersen was said to be independent of Enron 
because Andersen had 2,300 other audit clients, and Enron accounted for only about one 
percent of Andersen’s total revenue from auditing (Andersen’s Enron revenues were 
reported in 2001 as $100 million as compared to $9.34 billion in 2001 audit revenue). Id. at 
1176, n.33. Of course, Andersen’s independence as a firm did not extend to the partners 
responsible for doing the actual audit work for Enron. Id. at 1168. 
8.  Eisenberg & Macey, supra note 2, at 267. 
9.  The resignation of an auditor sends a very powerful negative signal to the capital markets 
and can have dire consequences not only for the firm whose auditor resigns, but also for 
the managers of the firm. See, e.g., Martin Fackler, Drawing A Line: Unlikely Team Sets 
Japanese Banking on Road to Reform, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2003, at A1 (describing how 
auditors’ failure to sign off on financial projections of a large Japanese bank caused a crisis 
that forced the bank to seek a $17 billion government bailout that put the financial 
institution under government control).  
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allowed the client company to “rent” the reputation of the accounting firm, 
which rents its reputation for care, honesty and integrity to its clients. As one 
observer characterized the market for auditors’ services:   
 
Public accountants knew they had a lot to lose if their 
clients’ information turned out to be false or misleading. 
Auditors who did a superior job would reduce the chance 
of their clients’ issuing unreliable information and so 
reduce their own risk of being sued by aggrieved investors. 
Such suits are costly to auditors; even unsuccessful suits 
damage their valuable reputations.10  
  
Unfortunately, the theory was flawed. The basic problem is that the 
accounting industry is not characterized by robust competition, and investors 
do not trust the numbers generated by accounting firms.11 As Ted Eisenberg 
and I have shown, there are no detectable statistically significant distinctions 
among the big accounting firms with respect to quality. 12  Rather, the 
accounting firms all perform about the same, and there simply is no way for a 
company to distinguish itself for probity and honesty in its accounting 
standards through its selection of auditors, contrary to the assumptions of 
economic theory.13  
There are many explanations for the decline in audit quality. These range 
from a decline in civil liability and changes in organizational form, which 
resulted in a diminution in incentives for accounting firms to monitor 
themselves,14 to changes in the complexity of financial transactions, which 
                                                                                                            
10.  Daniel B. Thornton, Financial Reporting Quality: Implications of Accounting Research, 
Testimony before the Canadian Senate Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and 
Commerce. (May 29, 2002). 
11.  According to a 2002 Gallup poll, seventy percent of U.S. investors stated that business 
accounting issues were hurting the investment climate “a lot.”  Raul Atkins, Comm’r, U.S. 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the Federalist Society 20th Annual Convention (Nov. 
14, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch111402psa.htm. 
12.  Eisenberg & Macey, supra note 2. 
13.  Id. 
14.  The shift of organizational form from the general partnership form to the Limited 
Liability Partnership form reduced the threat of liability faced by audit firm partners not 
directly involved in auditing a particular client. This, in turn, may have resulted in a 
diminution in the incentives of accounting firm partners to monitor the performance of 
their colleagues. The removal of aider and abettor liability risk reduced auditors’ incentives 
to monitor one another. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 
U.S. 164 (1994) (holding that section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5 prohibit only “the making 
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made financial reporting more difficult.15 Somewhat more controversially, the 
provision of consulting services by accounting firms upset the traditional 
balance of power between issuers and auditors, and contributed to the 
capture of accounting firms by their clients.16  
                                                                                                            
of a material misstatement (or omission) or the commission of a manipulative act” and do 
not prohibit the aiding and abetting of such acts). This decision was thought to have 
alleviated substantially the legal risks to outside advisors such as auditors and lawyers. This 
reduction in incentives was exacerbated in 1995 by passage of the Public Securities 
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). Pub. L. No. 104-67 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1998)). 
The PSLRA established new rules of pleading that require plaintiffs’ complaints to “state 
with particularity all facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with 
the required state of mind” when making a misstatement or omission in financial 
reporting. The PSLRA also delayed the beginning of discovery until after a court has 
decided whether to allow the case to go forward on the basis of the heightened pleading 
standards. Prior to passage of the PSLRA, plaintiffs’ attorneys could begin to gather 
documents and interview witnesses as soon as their complaint was filed. PSLRA also 
sharply limited the doctrine of “joint and several liability,” which insures that victims can 
recover full damages even if one or more of the parties to the fraud cannot pay. Under 
PSLRA, those whose reckless misconduct contributes to the fraud can be held responsible 
for only their proportionate share of victims’ losses. As a result, when the primary 
perpetrator of the fraud is bankrupt, investors cannot fully recover their losses from other 
entities, such as accounting firms. 
15.  Auditing became more complex as new and more sophisticated methods of financing 
proliferated, and as the audit rules themselves became more technical and complex. As a 
consequence, audit firms that were engaged by large public companies found that the 
“audit engagement teams” they assigned to perform audits had to spend increasingly large 
percentages of their time performing audit services for that client.  
16.  Where accounting firms also provide consulting services, accounting firms might be 
tempted to use auditing work either as a loss leader or “as a mechanism for ‘opening the 
door’ with a client for the purpose of pitching their (higher margin) consulting services.”  
Macey & Sale, supra note 6, at 1178. Providing consulting services further erodes auditor 
independence by shifting the balance of power away from the auditor and in the direction 
of the audit client when auditors are discussing audit work and retention issues. Worse, 
consulting services provide a means by which audit clients can reward auditors for 
succumbing to the client’s wishes about what accounting treatment should be used to 
report novel or complex transactions and business practices. Id. Where auditors only offer 
clients audit services, the client’s only option is to fire the auditor if the client does not 
think that the auditor is being sufficiently aggressive or compliant. But when the 
accountants also are peddling consulting services, the client can employ a “carrot and 
stick” strategy that rewards the accounting firm for being compliant and punishes the firm 
for being inflexible. This pressure is particularly acute in an environment in which the 
firm is the only client of the engagement partner from the accounting firm that is 
performing the audit, since a partner’s inability to procure lucrative consulting work 
would be reflected in the salary, promotion, and bonuses of the partner. As John Coffee 
has observed, it is difficult for an audit client to fire its auditor because such dismissals 
invite “potential public embarrassment, public disclosure of the reason for the auditor’s 
dismissal or resignation, and potential SEC intervention.”  John C. Coffee, Jr., 
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The point here is not simply that accounting firms have failed to 
distinguish themselves in their role as gate-keepers. This is well known. 
Rather, consistent with the theory advanced in this article, the point is that the 
political response to the dismal performance of auditors was not what it 
should have been. The political response should have been to address the real 
problems of capture cartelization that plagued, and continue to plague, the 
accounting industry. However, the response in Sarbanes-Oxley avoided 
addressing the real problems in the accounting industry and did nothing to 
improve competitive conditions or to facilitate entry into the accounting 
profession.  
Instead, the legislation dramatically increased demand for the audit 
services of the four surviving, incumbent accounting firms, thereby imposing 
massive costs on investors without any clear concomitant benefits. A survey 
by the Financial Executives International (FEI), an association of top 
financial executives, reported in The Economist, found that companies paid an 
average of $2.4 million more for their audits in the year 2004 than they had 
anticipated prior to the passage of the Act (and far more than the statute’s 
designers had envisaged). 17  As The Economist observed, the statute has 
“provided a bonanza for accountants and auditors—a profession thought to 
be much at fault in the scandals that inspired the law, and which the statute 
sought to rein in and supervise.”18 
As the General Accounting Office (GAO) has observed, the accounting 
industry is not competitive, and the elimination of Arthur Andersen 
dramatically increased the amount of concentration in the industry.19 The 
GAO also noted that smaller accounting firms face “significant barriers to 
entry” and that “market forces are not likely to result in” new entry.20 The 
Economist also observed that the four largest accounting firms—Deloitte, 
                                                                                                            
Understanding Enron: It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid, 57 BUS. LAW. 1403, 1411-12 (2002). 
Where a company is both an audit client as well as a consulting client of a particular 
accounting firm, “the client can easily terminate the auditor as a consultant or reduce its 
use of the firm’s consulting services, in retaliation for the auditor’s intransigence.”  Macey 
& Sale, supra note 6, at 1178. When the client terminates the high margin consulting 
services provided by the accounting firm and retains only the low margin auditing 
services, there is no need to make any public disclosure. This means that there is no risk 
that firing the auditor from a consulting engagement will provoke heightened scrutiny 
from investors, the SEC, or plaintiffs’ class action law firms. 
17.  Sarbanes-Oxley, A Price Worth Paying?, THE ECONOMIST, May 19, 2005, at 71-3.  
18.  Id.  
19.  Id. 
20.  Id. 
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Ernst & Young, KPMG, and Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC)—audit ninety-
seven percent of all large companies in America, and that the American 
Electronics Association, which represents 2,500 companies and is an 
outspoken critic of the law, maintains that lack of competition “is significantly 
increasing the costs of section 404 certification.”21 
Not surprisingly, the large accounting firms are proponents of Sarbanes-
Oxley, just as any firm would support legislation that allowed them to 
increase prices and reduce output. The chief executive of PwC has been called 
“an enthusiastic advocate of the new law.”22 The head of KPMG’s U.S. 
business unit recognizes the increase in costs associated with the statute, but 
asserts that such costs will fall in the future.23  
Turning to the substance of Sarbanes-Oxley, the basic problem with the 
relationship between auditors and their clients is that the individual auditors 
who comprise the audit engagement teams that actually conduct the audits of 
public companies are highly susceptible to capture. They typically spend 100 
percent of their time engaged in auditing a single firm. This problem of 
capture, coupled with reduced incentives to audit, was exactly what generated 
the problems that Arthur Andersen had in servicing its Enron account.24 
Accounting is a service business, and client satisfaction is as important in 
accounting as it is in all service businesses. Auditors’ careers increasingly have 
come to depend entirely on the “care and feeding” of their solitary client. 
Sarbanes-Oxley did nothing to address this problem of client “capture” of 
their auditors. Although the legislation could possibly have solved the capture 
problem by requiring public companies to change the accounting firms that 
audit them periodically, this rather radical change was not implemented. 
Instead, as a sort of “compromise,” Sarbanes-Oxley requires rotation every 
five years of the individuals within the accounting firms actually performing 
the audits of large companies.25  
This auditor rotation provision is likely to be both extremely costly and 
highly ineffectual. The provision will be costly because each new auditor will 
incur substantial billable start-up costs when she begins her new engagement 
every five years. The provision will be ineffectual because it will not reduce 
the tendency of auditors to be captured by their clients and may, in fact, 
                                                                                                            
21.  Id. (quoting the American Electronics Association). 
22.  Id. 
23.  Id. 
24.  Macey & Sale, supra note 6, at 1169. 
25.  Harry S. Davis & Megan Elizabeth Murray, Corporate Responsibility and Accounting Reform, 
BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP., Nov. 2002, at 1.  
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exacerbate those tendencies. A new auditor that is “rotated” onto the account 
of an accounting firm’s client certainly will not want to receive lower ratings 
for client satisfaction than her predecessor. In other words, the new auditor 
rotation provisions may trigger a destructive “race to the bottom” among 
auditors of reporting companies that want to be aggressive about reporting 
their financial results. Those auditors willing to use the most creative 
accounting techniques will receive the highest ratings for customer 
satisfaction. 
In sum, the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley provided demonstrable 
benefits for a very discrete interest group—the largest accounting firms. The 
benefits that the biggest accounting firms provide to investors is not at all 
clear, given the unreliable nature of the certifications of financial results that 
they provide. Nevertheless, demand for the services provided by the 
accounting firms remains strong, not because of market forces, but because 
of regulation.  
The SEC’s regulations have effectively cartelized the accounting industry 
by requiring that large, publicly held corporations be audited by accounting 
firms that obtain only a small proportion of their revenues from any one 
client. This, in turn, means that large public companies can only be audited by 
very large accounting firms. In my view, this is what led to the massive 
consolidation that the accounting industry has experienced in recent decades. 
Sarbanes-Oxley has further entrenched the largest accounting firm’s 
regulatory cartel, without doing anything to improve the quality of the 
financial reporting that is of vital importance to investors and capital markets. 
Using event study methodology, Ivy Xiying Zhang has estimated that the 
net private cost of Sarbanes-Oxley is $1.4 trillion,26 or about $460 for every 
person in the United States. This figure, which The Economist has characterized 
as “astonishing,” is an econometric estimate of the loss in shareholder wealth 
from the statute.27 In other words, Professor Zhang’s study measures the 
direct costs of the statute to investors. Some of these losses undoubtedly 
simply are dead-weight social losses associated with the highly inefficient 
statute. Another significant portion of the losses, however, reflect wealth 
transfers from widely dispersed, politically weak shareholders to well-
                                                                                                            
26.  Ivy Xiying Zhang, Economic Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 20 (Feb. 
2005) (paper, William E. Simon Graduate School of Business Administration, University 
of Rochester), http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/accounting/docs/speaker_papers/spring2005 
       /Zhang_Ivy_Economic_Consequences_of_S_O.pdf (last visited February 22, 2005). 
27.  Sarbanes-Oxley, A Price Worth Paying?, supra note 17. 
1:10 (2006)          The Politicization of American Corporate Governance 21 
organized, highly concentrated interest groups, like the biggest accounting 
firms. 
In other words, Sarbanes-Oxley, as it relates to accounting firms, appears 
to provide a straightforward application of George Stigler’s important insight 
that narrow interest groups tend to dominate the political process.28 Interest 
groups and their lobbyists and other agents interact with government officials 
in markets for political support. To survive in these political markets, 
regulators and politicians are constrained to generate results (in the form of 
statutes, regulations, and administrative agency action) that tend to benefit 
highly concentrated groups able to overcome the collective action problems 
of free-riding and rational ignorance. In this way political markets harm less 
well-organized groups, such as consumers, and private investors through 
higher prices and restricted output.29 
 
B. Credit Rating Agencies 
 
Credit ratings from credit rating agencies such as Moody’s and Standard 
and Poor’s provide predictive opinions on an isolated characteristic of a 
company—the likelihood that the company will be able to repay its rated debt 
in a timely manner. Credit rating agencies attempt to downplay the role that 
they play in corporate governance, claiming that, because their ratings are 
grounded on analysis of information generated by the companies themselves, 
they are not in the business of searching for and exposing fraud.30 This claim 
is somewhat disingenuous. It is generally accepted that the uninformed 
investors who inhabit financial markets clearly rely on the ratings generated 
by the major credit rating agencies. Why this is the case is something of a 
mystery. Moreover, as Frank Partnoy has observed, there is a great deal of 
evidence indicating that the product generated by the rating agencies, 
information, is both stale and inaccurate.31 The truly abominable performance 
of the credit rating agencies in their ratings of a whole host of debt issues, 
                                                                                                            
28.  G.J. Stigler, Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). 
29.  Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 355, 355-
58 (1974); Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV., 339, 339-71 
(1988).  
30.  Written Statement of Raymond W. McDaniel, President, Moody’s Investors Service, 
Before the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (Nov. 21, 2002), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/credrate/moodys.htm. 
31.  Credit Rating Agency Duopoly Relief Act of 2005: Hearing on H.R. 2990 Before the Subcomm. on 
Capital Mkts., Ins. and Gov’t Sponsored Enters., House Comm. on Fin. Servs., 109th Cong. (2005) 
(statement of Frank Partnoy, Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law).  
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including Orange County, Mercury Finance, Pacific Gas & Electric, Enron, 
WorldCom, and most recently General Motors and Ford, amply illustrates the 
point, as do a plethora of academic studies showing that credit ratings 
changes lag the market.32  
In particular, the Enron case provides a rather illustrative example of the 
credit ratings’ lag behind the market. 
 
Neither Standard & Poor’s nor Moody’s downgraded 
Enron’s debt below investment grade status until 
November 28, 2001, four days before the firm’s 
bankruptcy, when the company’s share price had plunged 
to a paltry sixty-one cents. . . . For Enron, the 
corporation’s $250 million in rated senior unsecured debt 
had declined in value from ninety cents to thirty-five cents 
on the dollar in the month preceding its downgrade. In 
other words, the market rejected the investment grade 
rating on Enron’s debt before the credit rating agencies 
exercised their power to downgrade it.33 
  
As with accounting firms, credit rating agencies have not lived up to their 
promise as important components of the corporate governance infrastructure. 
And, as with accounting firms, public choice theory and the economic theory 
of regulation provide the best explanation for the failure of credit rating in 
American corporate governance. Historically, companies that utilized the 
public markets for debt and equity utilized credit rating agencies for the same 
reason they utilized the services of accounting firms: they wanted their 
financial condition to be verified by a credible, independent source. Demand 
for the services of rating agencies derived from the fact that companies 
lowered their capital costs when they subscribed to the services of credit 
rating agencies, and the savings from such lower capital costs were greater 
than the costs of the subscription fees charged by the credit rating agencies 
for assigning a rating to a company’s securities. 
The historical evolution of the demand for the services of credit rating 
agencies is identical to that of the accounting firms. Genuine demand fueled 
                                                                                                            
32.  “Numerous academic studies have shown that ratings changes lag the market.”  Id. See also 
Rating Agencies and the Use of Credit Ratings Under the Securities Laws, Concept 
Release No. 33-8236, 68 Fed. Reg. 35258 (June 4, 2003). 
33.  Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and Enron, 89 CORNELL L. 
REV. 394, 406 (2004). 
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by market forces was displaced by ersatz demand fueled by regulatory 
requirements. This, in turn, led to the cartelization of both of these industries, 
as the number of accounting firms auditing large public companies dropped 
to four, and the number of credit rating agencies that enjoy the coveted status 
as SEC-sanctioned nationally recognized statistical rating organizations 
(NRSROs) has dropped to three.34 As cartelization occurred, we also have 
observed, in both industries, a marked diminution in the quality of the 
services provided to investors and markets.35  
SEC regulation, in the form of the NRSRO designation, has created an 
artificial demand for ratings, despite their lack of usefulness to investors.36 
These regulations require that investors limit their investments in companies 
to those whose debt is rated by one of the three companies designated by the 
SEC as NRSROs. The SEC uses NRSRO credit ratings to determine how 
much capital broker-dealer firms must maintain when they hold debt 
securities under Rule 15c3-1 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The 
ratings of NRSROs are also used to measure the credit risk of short-term 
instruments in the regulation of money market funds under Rule 2a-7 of the 
Investment Company Act of 1940. Issuers of certain debt securities that 
receive an investment grade rating from an NRSRO are entitled to register 
under the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act) on the shorter Form S-3. 
Banking and other regulators similarly rely upon NRSRO credit ratings to 
                                                                                                            
34.  In 1975, the SEC developed the concept of the nationally recognized statistical rating 
organization (NRSRO) to identify particular companies supplying credit ratings that could 
be relied on by the Commission for regulatory purposes. The term NRSRO was originally 
adopted by the Commission in 1975 solely for the purposes of Rule 15c3-1. See Adoption 
of Amendments to Rule 15c3-1 and Adoption of Alternative Capital Requirement for 
Certain Brokers and Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 11497, 40 Fed. Reg. 29795 (July 
16, 1975). 
35.  On the effects of cartelization in the credit-rating industry, see generally, Claire A. Hill, 
Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43 (2004). Hill calls particular attention to 
reforming the industry by “encourag[ing] a less concentrated market structure.”  Id. at 45. 
For empirical evidence on the perceived poor quality of credit rating agencies, see Rating 
the Rating Agencies: The State of Transparency and Competition: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. On Finanacial 
Services, 108th Cong. 101-122 (2003), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media 
        /pdf/108-18.pdf. Reduced competition in the accounting industry, largely as a result of 
pressures on accounting firms to consolidate in response to the SEC’s auditor 
independence rules, has “reduced the accounting firms’ incentives to differentiate their 
products on the basis of quality.”  Jonathan Macey & Hillary A. Sale, Observations on the 
Role of Commodification, Independence, and Governance in the Accounting Industry, 48 VILL. L. REV. 
1167, 1177 (2003).  
36.  Partnoy, supra note 31.  
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protect the capital of financial institutions. Thus, many regulated financial 
institutions can only purchase certain types of securities if they have received 
an investment grade rating from an NRSRO.37 
Thus, the best explanation for the puzzle that credit rating agencies 
simultaneously enjoy great success while providing no information of value to 
the investing public is that the SEC inadvertently created an artificial 
regulatory demand for the services of a small number of favored ratings 
agencies when it misguidedly invented the NRSRO designation. This 
designation has, over time, caused an artificial demand for ratings, despite 
their lack of usefulness to investors.  
 
C. The Market for Corporate Control 
 
The most important market-driven component of the U.S. corporate 
governance infrastructure is the market for corporate control. 38  This is 
because an efficient market for corporate control deters managers from 
shirking by running the firm below its full performance potential. Because 
running a firm below its firm potential would make it more likely that the 
company’s incumbent management would be replaced in a hostile acquisition, 
a robust market for corporate control is vitally important as a corporate 
mechanism for monitoring and disciplining managers.39 
Ironically, however, as the scientific evidence about the importance of the 
market for corporate control became so overwhelming as to be 
incontrovertible, 40 regulations impeding the market for corporate control 
                                                                                                            
37. Statement of Amy Lancellotta, Senior Counsel, Investment Company Institute, 
for the SEC Hearings on Issues Relating to Credit Rating Agencies, (Nov. 21, 2002), 
available at http://www.ici.org/statements/tmny/02_sec_2a-7_stmt.html. 
38.  The U.S. system has historically confronted agency problems through takeovers. A wealth 
of theoretical arguments and empirical evidence supports the proposition that takeovers 
address corporate governance problems, particularly by controlling managerial discretion. 
Shleifer and Vishny observe that “takeovers are widely interpreted as the critical corporate 
governance mechanism in the United States, without which managerial discretion cannot 
be effectively controlled.”  Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate 
Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 756 (1997). 
39.  Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in 
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1169 (1981); Henry G. Manne, Mergers 
and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 113 (1965).  
40.  A 1983 paper reviews the empirical evidence on the value created by corporate takeovers, 
finding that corporate takeovers overwhelmingly generate positive value. See Michael C. 
Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. 
FIN. ECON. 5 (1983). While the vast majority of scholars seem to agree with Jensen & 
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became ubiquitous.41 This confluence of events was not random. Rather, the 
law reflects the private interests of corporate managers, a discrete well-
organized interest group whose preferences are championed by organizations 
such as labor unions and the Business Roundtable.42 
As my colleague Roberta Romano has observed, a massive number of 
empirical studies have found uniformly and unanimously that regardless of 
the time period or acquisitive form, there are statistically significant positive 
abnormal returns on the investments of shareholders in companies that 
receive takeover bids.43 Clearly political theory and not economic theory is 
required to explain the regulatory burdens that impede the market for 
corporate control. The following sub-section describes the relationship 
between the goals of corporate governance and the operation of the market 
for corporate control. This sub-section is followed by an analysis of the legal 
impediments that have arisen to impede the market for corporate control. 
 
1.  Corporate Governance 
  
The market for corporate control is a pure market process. Government 
intervention is not needed to correct structural defects in this market. Rather, 
regulatory intervention, when it occurs, reflects the efforts of special interest 
groups such as managers and labor unions to impede the markets in order to 
                                                                                                            
Ruback, there are a few notable dissents. See, e.g., ROBERT B. REICH, THE NEXT 
AMERICAN FRONTIER, 140-72 (1983); Robert H. Hayes & William J. Abernathy, Managing 
Our Way to Economic Decline, HARV. BUS. REV., July-Aug. 1980, at 67, 73-74. 
41.  My colleague Roberta Romano has similarly observed, in her article, A Guide to Takeovers: 
Theory, Evidence, and Regulation, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 119, 120-1 (1992), that “The empirical 
evidence is most consistent with value-maximizing, efficiency-based explanations of 
takeovers. Yet the thrust of regulation is to thwart and burden takeovers, as if they were 
non-value-maximizing wealth transfers.”  Romano goes on to catalogue the variety of 
regulations that serve to restrict on the market for corporate control. 
42.  The Business Roundtable is an association of chief executive officers of leading U.S. 
corporations founded in 1972 in order: (1) to enable chief executives from different 
corporations to work together to analyze specific issues affecting the economy and 
business and (2) to present government and the public with knowledgeable, timely 
information, and with practical, positive proposals for action. Business Roundtable 
History, http://www.businessroundtable.org/aboutUs/history.html. (last visited April 11, 
2006). The Business Roundtable is comprised of the CEOs of around 200 of the largest 
corporation’s in the U.S. representing about fifty percent of U.S. GDP. Amitai Etzioni, 
Special Interest Groups Versus Constituency Representation, 8 RESEARCH SOC. MOVEMENTS, 
CONFLICTS & CHANGE 171, 184 (1985).  
43.  ROBERTA ROMANO, FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW 230 (1993).  
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protect incumbent management at firms that are either actual or potential 
targets.  
The market for corporate control is simply risk arbitrage on a very grand 
scale. Risk arbitrage involves the time-honored process of “buying low and 
selling high.” Unfortunately, the response by corporate managers to efforts by 
entrepreneurs to enter this market has been to “buy law” in order to prevent 
take-over professionals from buying low.  
In efficient capital markets, poor performance is hard to hide. When 
firms fare poorly, such poor performance is reflected in the firm’s share 
prices, and in a host of other indicators, including accounting data, 
particularly reported earnings, and sales performance in comparison to rival 
companies. All of these indicators are highly accessible and visible to a whole 
host of sophisticated outsiders watching the company, such as analysts, 
arbitrageurs, and venture capitalists. When these indicators lag relative to 
industry and sector competitors, potential acquirers have a strong incentive to 
notice; by acquiring the shares of a poorly managed firm at a depressed price 
that reflects the firm’s poor performance, the acquirer can institute the 
changes necessary to restore top corporate performance. Generally, these 
changes require that the top management of the company being acquired be 
displaced by a new management team. 
Thus, a properly functioning market for corporate control clearly 
provides benefits for the shareholders of companies whose shares are 
purchased by the outside bidder. Such shareholders receive a substantial 
premium, generally around fifty percent of the price at which the target firm’s 
shares had been trading before the bid. 44  Moreover, even non-selling 
shareholders benefit when there is a hostile acquisition of a public company 
in which they own shares. Such non-selling shareholders benefit when the 
new management team takes over, reorganizes the target company, and does 
what successful bidders do: provide better discipline for management, seek 
strategic synergies with other companies, and sell assets, subsidiaries, 
divisions, and other components of the target that are not adding value to 
shareholders. In efficient capital markets, share prices for non-selling 
shareholders go up when these strategic changes are announced by competent 
bidders.  
                                                                                                            
44.  Theodor Baums & Kenneth E. Scott, Taking Shareholder Protection Seriously?  Corporate 
Governance in the U.S. and Germany,  17 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 44, 59 n.55 (2005);  Gregg A. 
Jarrell et al., The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. Econ. 
Persp. 49, 52 (1988).  
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It is quite clear that takeovers provide benefits for target firm 
shareholders, whether they sell their shares or not. Absent regulatory 
distortions, the best strategy for target management to use to avoid being 
ousted in a hostile takeover is to keep share prices high. Higher share prices 
deter hostile bids by making such bids more costly because they destroy the 
arbitrage potential that exists when shares are undervalued relative to their 
true potential.45  
Because share prices represent the best available, and indeed the only, real 
time, unbiased assessment of a company’s performance and future prospects, 
by providing strong incentives for target managers to keep such share prices 
high, the market for corporate control is an elemental component of any 
corporate governance system in which the owners of residual claims in the 
company are not in positions of management. Improved corporate 
governance is a byproduct of an efficient market for corporate control. Such 
improved governance, however, is not limited to those firms that actually 
receive premium bids from outside acquirers. Rather, the genius of the market 
for corporate control as a corporate governance device is that it improves the 
quality of the corporate performance governance at all publicly held firms 
whose shares are “contestable.”46  
The reason that the benefits of the monitoring provided by potential 
bidders is not limited to the shareholders in firms fortunate enough actually 
to receive a bid from a hostile bidder is because managers who want to avoid 
being displaced in a hostile takeover must keep the prices of their firms’ 
shares high in order to avoid being ousted in a tender offer. Because 
managers and boards know that they will be ousted following a successful 
hostile acquisition, they will work harder to maximize shareholder value in 
                                                                                                            
45.  See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 39. (“Managers will attempt to reduce agency costs 
in order to reduce the chance of takeover, and the process of reducing agency costs leads 
to higher prices for shares.”). See also Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 
35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1264 (1982) (arguing that the market for corporate control 
“simultaneously gives managers of all firms who wish to avoid a takeover an incentive to 
operate efficiently and to keep share prices high”). 
46.  In this context, the term contestable means susceptible to the market for corporate 
control. A firm’s shares are contestable in the market for corporate control if a majority of 
the shares are in the hands of independent (non-management-affiliated) value-maximizing 
shareholders. Where, for example, a majority of the voting shares of a company are in the 
hands of small-stake shareholders or institutional investors focused on share price 
performance, the company’s shares are contestable. By contrast, the company’s shares are 
not contestable where shares are parked with friendly institutional investors or where 
incumbent management and their allies have shares with supermajority voting rights that 
prevent an outside acquirer from obtaining a majority of the voting shares.  
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order to avoid that possibility. Thus, a takeover threat will not only discipline 
management, but also discipline the non-monitoring board.47 
The tender offer was invented in the 1960s, and fundamentally changed 
the economic landscape for American corporations. As Theo Baums and Ken 
Scott recently observed, prior to the introduction of the tender offer, 
launching a proxy fight for the election of directors was the only way that a 
challenger could hope to oust an underperforming incumbent management 
team.48 
As a corporate governance device, proxy fights suffer from two distinct 
disadvantages relative to takeovers. First, incumbent management enjoys a 
number of structural advantages over outsiders in proxy contests. Incumbent 
management controls the timing of the contest, and can charge election 
expenses to the company. The incumbents also have better information about 
who the company’s shareholders are and about what issues are likely to appeal 
to particular cohorts of shareholders. Moreover, when a company is involved 
in a proxy fight, shareholders are required to choose between the incumbent 
management team, which is a known quantity, and a group of unknown 
outside raiders.49 
                                                                                                            
47.  As important as the market for corporate control clearly is, it nonetheless is possible to 
overstate the role played by this particular market in corporate governance. In particular, 
the market for corporate control is not capable of dealing with recent corporate 
governance problems at firms like Enron and WorldCom, which involve artificially 
inflated earnings, profits, and other measures of corporate performance. See E.S. 
Browning, Abreast of the Market: Investor Confidence Remains Fickle, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2002, 
at C1 (“Scandals at Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, Tyco International, Adelphia 
Communications, ImClone Systems and a host of other companies have raised questions 
about whether corporate earnings reports and corporate executives can be trusted.”). The 
market for corporate control exerts powerful disciplinary pressure on under-performing 
management by providing arbitrage possibilities where share prices lag because companies 
have slothful or corrupt management. The depressed share prices in such companies 
present attractive investment opportunities for entrepreneurial corporate raiders, who 
profit by purchasing a controlling interest in under-performing companies and installing 
more competent and motivated management. See Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 38, at 756 
(noting that the raider benefits when the share prices of the target firm rise to reflect the 
improved earnings generated by the new management team). However, the market for 
corporate control only disciplines bad management when the target firm’s share prices are 
depressed. Because accounting fraud causes share prices to be artificially inflated rather 
than depressed, the takeover entrepreneurs who drive the market for corporate control 
have no incentive to launch the hostile takeovers that discipline managers employing 
questionable accounting practices to over-inflate their companies’ share prices. Id.  
48.  Baums & Scott, supra note 44, at 58-59. 
49.  Id. 
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But the more profound deficiency in proxy contests as corporate 
governance devices is that those launching proxy contests lack credibility 
relative to those launching takeover contests in the form of tender offers. 
Potential acquirers making tender offers for a controlling block of a 
company’s shares have enormous credibility because they are risking their 
own capital to acquire the controlling block. Having gained control of the 
company, tender offerors stand to benefit by managing the business in such a 
way as to increase the value of their shares, and the shares of their fellow 
shareholders.  
By contrast, an entrepreneur who launches a proxy contest need not, in 
theory, own any shares in the target company whose board she seeks to 
displace. Rather, the outside “raider” asks that shareholders take it on faith 
that a successful proxy battle will lead to improvements in corporate 
governance. Thus, it is not surprising in the least that proxy contests are rarely 
successful unless organized and conducted by raiders who have very 
significant investments in the shares of the target firms. Only raiders who also 
large block at the time they launch their proxy contests can make a credible 
commitment to the target firm shareholders that their goal is to maximize the 
value of the entire firm, rather than to obtain the private benefits of control 
simply to loot the firm. 
Thus, the emergence of the hostile tender offer in the 1960s should be 
viewed as a major innovation in the history of corporate governance. It 
provided the first large-scale, self-effectuating corporate control devices. The 
hostile tender offer is large-scale because it affects all shareholders and 
because it involves the deployment of massive resources by outside bidders. 
These resources are required to monitor potential target companies, to 
evaluate which incumbent management teams are operating so inefficiently 
that they warrant being displaced in a hostile bid, to effectuate the hostile 
acquisition, and to implement the strategic plan to redeploy the target 
company’s assets to higher value uses.  
The market for corporate control is self-effectuating because it emerges 
spontaneously from market forces without the need for any action taken or 
resources deployed on the part of the subject company. An efficient market 
for corporate control is such an effective corporate governance device that it 
dramatically facilitates the separation of equity ownership and managerial 
responsibility in unique ways not replicable by other corporate governance 
devices. In particular, the tender offer, which is the pivotal device in the 
market for corporate control, obviates the need for target company 
shareholders to make comparisons of the relative merits of competing 
management teams before deciding whether to approve a proposed change in 
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control transaction. Rather, as Baums and Scott have observed, “[w]ith the 
development of the tender offer in the 1960s, [shareholders] didn’t have to 
make a comparison between alternative management teams but merely a 
comparison between the price being offered by the acquirer and the market 
price under current management.”50  
Under this system, acquirers seeking control of target companies began to 
fare much better than they had when the principal strategy available to them 
was the proxy contest, but target management fared worse. As the market for 
corporate control became more effective as a governing device, life became 
less comfortable for incumbent management, who felt increasing pressure to 
maintain high share prices in order to reduce the probability that they would 
face a hostile tender offer for control.   
 
2. Politics and the Market for Corporate Control 
  
In addition to simply being more responsive to the needs of shareholders, 
management resorted to a number of additional tactics in response to the 
tender offer era. First, in 1968, “[m]anagement struck back” against the 
unfettered operation of the market for corporate control by supporting the 
passage of the Williams Act, which deterred corporate takeovers by 
dramatically increasing both the out-of-pocket costs and the legal risks that 
bidders face when launching a tender offer.51  
Specifically, the Williams Act appropriates valuable property rights in 
information belonging to bidders by requiring such bidders to disclose such 
information to the financial markets. Among other things, the Williams Act 
requires that individuals, groups, and firms making tender offers supply the 
markets with their identities, their plans for the target firm, and their sources 
of financing.52 The requirements of the Williams Act made it easier for target 
firm management to entrench themselves by giving them “earlier warning” 
about an outside bid, and more time to resist.53 
As a consequence of the Williams Act and other anti-takeover efforts, 
hostile takeovers began a steady decline from fourteen percent to four 
percent of all mergers and acquisition activity.54 
                                                                                                            
50.  Id. 
51.  Id. at 58. 
52.  Williams Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, § 3, 82 Stat. 454, 456 (1968). 
53.  Baums & Scott, supra note 44, at 58. 
54.  Henry G. Manne, Bring Back the Hostile Takeover, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2002, at A18. 
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In addition to their legislative efforts, managers championed a number of 
changes to their charters and bylaws designed to impede the market for 
corporate control. As Baums and Scott have observed, managers and their 
attorneys implemented staggered boards of directors; abolished the right of 
shareholders to remove directors without cause, to hold special meetings, or 
to act by written consent without meeting; and employed supermajority 
shareholder vote requirements to approve clean-up mergers which members 
of the prior board had not approved.55 
Two factors prevented managers from being able to accomplish very 
much to retard the market for corporate control. First, fundamental changes 
to a company’s corporate governance structure require that a company 
change its articles of incorporation, which, in turn, requires shareholder 
approval. Rational shareholders would not approve proposed changes to the 
governance structure of a company that would make them worse off by 
impeding the operation of the market for corporate control. 
Second, there were important innovations in the market for corporate 
control, particularly the emergence of the leveraged buy-out and junk bond 
financing, which facilitated the takeover market and tended to counteract the 
pernicious effects of managerial entrenchment efforts.56 
The Delaware judiciary struck a grave blow to shareholders and to the 
free operation of the market for corporate control when it upheld the use of a 
radical new anti-takeover device, the poison pill in Moran v. Household 
International.57 That case deserves to be counted as the worst opinion in the 
history of corporate law. Countless trillions of dollars in shareholder wealth 
have been lost by the failure of state court judges, particularly in Delaware, to 
protect the interests of shareholders during corporate control contests.58      
 
a. The Poison Pill 
  
Technically called a shareholder rights plan, the term “poison pill” is the 
nickname for a particular device utilized by public companies to avoid a 
hostile takeover by making themselves unattractive to the investor who wants 
to make the hostile acquisition. Poison pills prevent hostile takeovers by 
                                                                                                            
55.  Baums & Scott, supra note 44, at 58-59. 
56.  See, e.g., Ronald Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive 
Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 837-38 (1981).  
57.  Moran v. Household International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). 
58.  See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 204 (1991). 
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increasing the costs of acquiring a large block of shares in a target company 
whose board has installed a poison pill. A poison pill involves the issuance by 
a company of a new class of stock, usually preferred shares, that provide 
holders with the rights to purchase additional shares, either in the target 
company, so-called “flip-in” pills, or even in the acquirer, so-called “flip-over” 
pills, whenever certain triggering events occur. The most common triggering 
event is the acquisition of a certain threshold percentage (often thirty percent) 
of target firm shares by any acquirer that the target company board finds 
unacceptable. Should an outside bidder make acquisitions that exceed the 
designated threshold without the permission of the target firm’s board of 
directors, the target firm’s shareholders are able to purchase additional shares 
at hugely discounted prices. The device is called a poison pill because these 
discount purchases have the intended effect of diluting the ownership 
interests of the outside bidder, who is specifically precluded from 
participating in the discount purchases permitted to the other investors.   
Because poison pills have been technically evaluated as representing 
merely the issuance of a new class of shares, which most companies can do 
without shareholder approval, poison pills may be implemented by corporate 
boards without any shareholder action. When adopted, the rights initially 
attach to the corporation’s outstanding common stock, cannot be traded 
separately from the common stock, and are priced so that exercise of the 
option would be economically irrational. As mentioned above, the pill or 
shareholder rights become exercisable and can trade separately from the 
common stock only when a triggering event occurs. 
A pill’s flip-over feature typically is triggered when the target is merged 
into the acquirer or one of its affiliates after the acquirer obtains the specified 
percentage of the target’s common stock. When this triggering event occurs, 
the target firm’s shareholders become entitled to purchase common stock of 
the acquiring company, typically at a deeply discounted price. These 
purchases have the effect of impairing the acquirer’s capital structure and 
drastically diluting the interest of the acquirer’s previous stockholders. The 
pre-existing shareholders in the bidding firm are harmed by flip-over poison 
pills because triggering the flip-over pill gives target shareholders the option 
to purchase shares of the acquiring company at deeply discounted prices, 
which dilutes the interests of the pre-existing shareholders of the acquirer. 
Where flip-over pills are triggered by the merger of the acquirer and the 
target, flip-in pills are triggered merely by the acquisition of a specified 
percentage (usually twenty percent) of the issuer’s common stock. When a 
flip-in pill is triggered, all target firm shareholders except the acquirer are 
permitted to buy shares in the target at a deeply discounted price.  
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Poison pills impede the market for corporate control by eliminating the 
possibility of hostile takeovers in firms with poison pills in place. Significantly, 
the shareholder rights distributed by companies as poison pills can be 
redeemed by the target at little or no cost to the issuing company. Redeeming 
the rights eliminates the poison pill, and permits an acquisition to proceed. In 
other words, the consequence of the poison pill is to require acquirers to 
obtain the approval of target company boards of directors before proceeding. 
The harm to acquiring firm shareholders from the triggering of a poison pill is 
so severe that the poison pill has never been intentionally triggered.59  
Thus, the poison pill has effectively destroyed the hostile takeover. Those 
companies with the most venal management teams are immune from ouster 
in a hostile takeover. Only companies with benign, other-regarding boards of 
directors will redeem their poison pill rights plans and permit outside 
acquirers to effectuate a change in control. 
 
b. The Delaware Judiciary 
  
In a key passage in Moran, the Delaware Supreme Court observed that 
permitting companies to implement poison pill rights plans without 
shareholder votes would not have deleterious corporate governance effects 
because such plans would be subject to intense scrutiny by the courts. In 
particular, with respect to the poison pill rights plan adopted by Household 
International, the Court asserted that:  
 
[T]he Rights Plan is not absolute. When the Household 
Board of Directors is faced with a tender offer and a 
request to redeem the Rights, they will not be able to 
arbitrarily reject the offer. They will be held to the same 
fiduciary standards any other board of directors would be 
held to in deciding to adopt a defensive mechanism, the 
same standard as they were held to in originally approving 
the Rights Plan.60  
  
Unfortunately, state courts in general and the Delaware courts in 
particular have not lived up to their obligation to protect shareholders by 
                                                                                                            
59.  Baums & Scott, supra note 44, at 59. 
60.  Moran, 500 A.2d at 1354.  
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policing the implementation, if not the adoption, of poison pills.61 Instead, 
the requirement that the decision to use the pill be evaluated by state courts 
to determine whether the decision is consistent with the directors’ fiduciary 
responsibilities has “turned out to be of little substance.” 62  Subsequent 
decisions have permitted target company boards of directors to thwart 
outside acquisition attempts by leaving their poison pill rights plans in place 
on the basis of highly dubious justifications. For example, in Paramount 
Communications v. Time, Inc., the court was persuaded not to act to force 
management to redeem its pill on the thin reed of management’s highly self-
serving claim that it had a “strategic plan” that it thought would lead to 
greater returns to shareholders than the acquirer was offering.63  
The decision in Time is particularly troubling because the bid was all cash 
and was made for 100 percent of the target company’s shares.64 The only 
coherent justification for defensive tactics such as the poison pill is that they 
protect shareholders from coercive two-tiered bids, in which shareholders are 
induced to sell their shares to a bidder offering to purchase less than 100 
percent of the company’s outstanding shares because they are concerned that 
the bidder will obtain control of the firm and mismanage it, thereby driving 
down the value of any remaining shares.65 These sorts of two-tiered offers are 
coercive because target firm shareholders face a collective action problem 
similar to a prisoner’s dilemma: the best outcome for all shareholders would 
be for none to tender in the first stage of a coercive two-tiered offer, but the 
best outcome for any individual shareholder would be to be able to sell her 
shares for cash, particularly if the coercive bidder’s bid succeeds.  
In Moran itself, the court justified allowing the target firm to retain its 
poison pill because the pill was adopted “in reaction to what it perceived to 
be the threat in the market place of coercive two-tier tender offers.”66 Later 
court decisions have ignored the fundamental distinction between two-tiered 
bids and cash bids for 100 percent of the stock in the target company.67 For 
                                                                                                            
61.  See Baums & Scott, supra note 44, at 59 (observing that the requirement that use of the pill 
must pass muster with the Delaware Supreme Court “proved hollow”). 
62.  Baums & Scott, supra note 44, at 59. 
63.  Paramount Communications v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1989). See also 
Unitrin v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1385 (Del. 1995).  
64.  Time, 571 A.2d at 1142. 
65.  William J. Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark Repellents and Takeout Mergers: The 
Case Against Fiduciary Duties, 1983 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 341, 350-53 (1983). 
66.  Moran v. Household Int’l, 500 A2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985).  
67.  See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1342 (Del. 1987) 
(“This Court has recognized the coercive nature of two-tier partial tender offers.”); 
 
1:10 (2006)          The Politicization of American Corporate Governance 35 
example, in Time, the Delaware Supreme Court permitted the firm to retain its 
poison pill despite the fact that the bidder was offering all cash for 100 
percent of the target firm’s shares, thereby obviating any argument that the 
pill was needed to protect target firm shareholders from the coercive effect of 
a two-tier bid.68  
Thus, courts have failed to live up to their promise to protect 
shareholders from the use of the poison pill to insulate incumbent 
management from the salutary effects of the market for corporate control. In 
addition, courts have failed to restrict the use of poison pills to their proper 
context—the regulation of coercive two-tiered tender offers. Moreover, 
courts have ignored the chilling effects that poison pill rights plans have on 
the market for corporate control, and hence, on the governance of the 
publicly held corporation. Specifically, by making hostile acquisitions more 
costly and more difficult, poison pills impose significant disincentives on 
acquirers. Not only are acquirers deprived of incentives to make bids, they 
also are deprived of incentives to engage in the costly search process 
necessary to identify under-valued firms.  
In Moran, the Delaware Supreme Court appears to have gone out of its 
way to ignore these incentive effects. The court blithely observed that the 
target firm’s poison pill was not suspect merely because it did not prevent 
stockholders from receiving tender offers, failing to understand the plaintiffs’ 
cogent argument that allowing the poison pill would cause shareholders to 
“lose their right to receive and accept tender offers.”69 Unable or unwilling to 
see beyond the banal technicality that bidders retain the power to make a 
hostile tender offer for firms with poison pill rights plans, the court failed to 
acknowledge that such plans destroy bidders’ incentives to do so unless they 
can engineer a way to get the approval of the target firm’s board of directors 
(in which case, of course, the bid is no longer hostile).70  
                                                                                                            
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 (Del. 1985) (finding a “grossly 
inadequate” two-tier offer to be coercive).  
68.  571 A.2d at 1140. 
69.  500 A.2d at 1354. 
70.  There are at least two ways that bidders can obtain the approval of the target firm’s board. 
The first is by making the tender offer contingent on the decision by the target company’s 
board to redeem the pill. This contingency is now a routine part of the tender offers 
bidding process. Bidders can also obtain the approval of the target firm’s board by 
launching a proxy contest for control of the target board simultaneously with the 
announcement of a tender offer. By acquiring control of the board, the bidder can use 
such control to redeem the pill. Staggered boards of directors, of course, make the latter 
 
 Virginia Law & Business Review 1:10 (2006) 36 
Thus, by judicial fiat, the Delaware courts have removed from the 
marketplace the hostile tender offer, which is the most powerful corporate 
governance device in the shareholders’ corporate governance arsenal. As 
Baums and Scott presciently have observed, “Delaware jurisprudence seems 
to be willing, in substance . . . to give management something approaching an 
absolute veto over hostile tender offers despite overwhelming evidence that 
they confer large benefits on target shareholders.”71 Again, just as courts and 
legislatures have undermined the vitality of credit rating agencies and 
accounting firms, they have undermined the market for corporate control.  
 
D. Organized Stock Exchanges 
  
Organized stock exchanges, particularly the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), used to play an important role in U.S. corporate governance. When a 
public corporation listed on a stock exchange, that corporation was making a 
credible commitment to abide by a set of corporate governance rules 
designed to maximize shareholder wealth. 72  The commitment was made 
credible by the threat of delisting, which, historically, had draconian effects on 
companies because of the lack of alternative trading venues for shares in 
public companies. Over time, however, advances in technology and the 
development of markets have weakened the primacy of the traditional 
exchanges. A whole host of competitors for the traditional stock exchanges 
have emerged. 
Traditionally, firms have not listed on more than one venue. When firms 
changed from one trading venue to another, it was usually because they had 
grown and were promoted from the over-the-counter markets to the NYSE. 
Decisions by highly successful companies such as Google and Microsoft to 
remain in the over-the-counter markets, along with the ability of firms such as 
Hewlett-Packard simultaneously to be listed on both the NYSE and 
NASDAQ, illustrate the change in the traditional ordering. 
The modern stock exchange is subject to vigorous competition from a 
variety of sources, including both rival exchanges and alternative trading 
venues such as Electronic Communications Networks and Alternative 
Trading Systems. This competition has strained the exchanges’ capacity for 
                                                                                                            
tactic more difficult for bidders. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover 
Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887 (2002).  
71.  Baums & Scott, supra note 44, at 59.  
72.  Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, From Markets to Venues: Securities Regulation in an 
Evolving World, 58 STAN. L. REV. 563, 569 (2005).  
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self-regulation and undermined their incentives to regulate in the public 
interest with respect to issues related to the corporate governance of their 
members. Moreover, the available evidence indicates that the organized 
exchanges do not even act as stand-alone regulators anymore. Instead, they 
are better understood as conduits for the SEC, which coordinates the 
corporate governance regulations that ostensibly are promulgated under the 
exchanges’ authority as self-regulatory organizations.73 As the Special Study on 
Market Structure, Listing Standards and Corporate Governance, pointed out, “the 
SEC had adopted a practice of encouraging the exchanges ‘voluntarily’ to 
adopt given corporate governance listing standards and in the process has 
urged the exchanges’ listed companies and shareholders to reach consensus 
on those standards.”74 The SEC now coordinates the regulatory price fixing 
among the exchanges’ self-regulatory organizations with respect to every facet 
of the exchanges’ relationships with listed companies. Thus, the SEC has 
undermined the traditional way that exchanges competed with one another to 
provide efficient corporate governance rules. 
A cogent example of this phenomenon is the one-share, one-vote listing 
requirement. During the 1980s, the managers of several firms that were listed 
on the NYSE were concerned about the possibility of a hostile takeover, and 
wanted to adopt a particularly potent defensive strategy, which involved 
recapitalizing the firm with additional classes of voting stock, to be held by 
management, which would have significantly greater voting rights than the 
shares held by other shareholders. The problem with this recapitalization 
strategy was that it clearly violated a long-standing NYSE rule providing that 
all shares of common stock of listed companies could have one, and only one, 
vote.75  
                                                                                                            
73.  The available evidence here consists largely of series of episodes in which the exchanges 
fail to self-regulate, often followed by a coordinated regulation led by the SEC. Self-
regulation by the exchanges is in general dysfunctional in significant part because 
securities are often traded simultaneously in multiple venues, thus inhibiting the ability of 
exchanges to unilaterally enforce regulations. See Macey & O'Hara, supra, note 72, at 575, 
577-79 (“As a purely descriptive matter, the available evidence is inconsistent with the 
assertion that rival trading venues compete to produce corporate law rules. Rather, the 
accurate depiction of the competitive situation is that the SEC coordinates the regulatory 
standards of the exchanges and the Nasdaq in order to prevent competition among these 
trading venues from occurring at all.”). 
74.  Id. at 571, 577. See also Robert Todd Lang et al., American Bar Association, Special Study on 
Market Structure, Listing Standards and Corporate Governance, 57 BUS. LAW. 1487, 1503 (2002).  
75.  See ANNETTE B. POULSEN & KEN LEHN, SEC OFFICE OF CHIEF ECONOMIST, UPDATE—
THE EFFECTS OF DUAL-CLASS RECAPITALIZATIONS ON SHAREHOLDER WEALTH: 
INCLUDING EVIDENCE FROM 1986 AND 1987, Table 1 (1987). See also Jeffrey N. Gordon, 
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The SEC was deeply concerned that several high-profile listed firms, 
notably General Motors Corporation (GM) and Dow Jones, Inc., wanted to 
engage in these so-called “dual-class recapitalizations.” The NYSE was 
alarmed when both of these firms decided to proceed with their plans to offer 
dual classes of voting stock, in flagrant violation of the NYSE’s rules. For the 
NYSE, delisting these firms would have caused a significant loss of both 
prestige and revenue. But for GM and Dow Jones, the consequences would 
have been negligible. Delisting would have meant that shares in the two firms 
would have been traded on an NYSE competitor such as the American Stock 
Exchange (AMEX) or the NASDAQ, both of which permitted dual-class 
recapitalizations.  
This episode illustrates the NYSE’s inability to enforce its own corporate 
governance rules in today’s new world of competing trading venues. 
Ultimately, the NYSE was forced to relax its listing requirements in order to 
avoid losing two of its most valuable listings. In order to avoid a recurrence 
of this embarrassing episode, the NYSE then petitioned the SEC to impose a 
uniform voting rights standard for all publicly traded firms. Although the 
SEC granted the NYSE’s request, the SEC’s uniform voting rights standard 
was ruled invalid as an impermissible extension of the Commission’s 
regulatory authority into the realm of corporate governance, which 
traditionally is the domain of the states.76  
 
                                                                                                            
Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CAL. L. REV. 
1, at 4 (1988), in which Gordon counts over eighty public firms that have “adopted, or 
proposed to adopt, capital structures with two classes of common stock.”  In footnote 2, 
Gordon adds, “One recent estimate is that since 1985 the number of companies with dual 
classes of stock has risen from 119 to 306.”  Id. at 4 n.2  (citing Dual Stock Categories Spur 
Powerful Debate Over Stability vs. Gain, Wall Street Journal, May 17, 1988, at p. 1, col. 6). 
76.  Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1990), declared the SEC’s rule 
invalid. However, by the time the Court had ruled, the NASDAQ, the AMEX, and the 
NYSE had adopted the SEC’s proposed rule, and none was willing to risk its ongoing 
relationship with the SEC by returning to its previous rule. Barbara Franklin, New Stock 
Issue Rules: ‘Technical’ Changes Seen Resulting in Tougher Enforcement, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 7, 1989, at 
5. It should be added that the ruling in Business Roundtable v. SEC that the SEC lacked the 
authority to promulgate rules of corporate governance has been weakened considerably, if 
not eviscerated entirely, by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which gave a significant 
amount of new power to the SEC in the realm of corporate governance. Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7211-7219 (2005). 
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E. Initial Public Offerings  
  
Another poorly understood institution of corporate governance is the 
initial public offering. When a company makes a public offering of securities, 
it commits itself to rigorous monitoring by a cadre of lawyers, investment 
bankers, and financial analysts, all of whom face reputational and legal risks 
for failure to do an adequate job of protecting investors, a process which, in 
this context, involves serving a gate-keeping function.77 The gate-keeping 
function in initial public offerings revolves around the due diligence 
investigation that the underwriters perform in connection with the offering. 
The term “due diligence” does not appear anywhere in the 1933 Act, the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or any SEC rule.78 The origins of the term 
are in the language of section 11 of the 1933 Act, which exempts from 
liability underwriters who reasonably believed, after “reasonable 
investigation,” that no disclosure violations occurred in the offering, and from 
the language of section 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act, which precludes liability for 
underwriters who exercised “reasonable care” and did not know or could not 
have known of such violations.79  
As for both aspects of the term “due diligence,” the issue of whether a 
due diligence investigation was sufficient is determined with reference to “the 
standard of reasonableness [that is] required of a prudent man in the 
management of his own property.”80 This reasonableness standard is used to 
evaluate both the adequacy of an underwriter’s due diligence efforts as well as 
to determine whether the underwriter will be permitted to assert a due 
diligence defense. 
                                                                                                            
77.  Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 650, 
654 (1984).  
78.  Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a-77aa (2006); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a-78kk (2006). 
79.  See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 207-08 (1976) for an example of the usage of 
the term “due diligence” in relation to section 11 of the 1933 Act (“§ 11 of the 1933 Act 
unambiguously creates a private action for damages when a registration statement includes 
untrue statements of material facts or fails to state material facts necessary to make the 
statements therein not misleading . . . [E]xperts such as accountants who have prepared 
portions of the registration statement are accorded a ‘due diligence’ defense,” which is 
“[i]n effect, a negligence standard” whereby “[a]n expert may avoid civil liability with 
respect to the portions of the registration statement for which he was responsible by 
showing that ‘after reasonable investigation’ he had ‘reasonable ground[s] to believe’ that 
the statements for which he was responsible were true and there was no omission of a 
material fact.”). 
80.  15 U.S.C.A. § 77k(c). 
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The issue of what constitutes appropriate due diligence is highly 
contextual. Courts recognize that “[i]t is impossible to lay down a rigid rule 
suitable for every case defining the extent [of an underwriter’s due diligence 
obligations].”81 However, some important general points can be made about 
the nature of due diligence investigations that are applicable to all financing 
transactions. Specifically, it is clear that investors rely on underwriters to 
discover and ensure the disclosure of the essential facts relevant to the 
financing and to the company engaged in the transactions. Banks conducting 
due diligence investigations should meet with the management of the issuer in 
the context of their due diligence investigations. Such meetings are necessary 
for the underwriter to establish its “due diligence defense” under section 11 
of the 1933 Act. However, the underwriter also has an affirmative duty to 
verify the accuracy of statements made by management as well as those 
contained in a registration statement. 
In addition, regardless of what else might have been done, due diligence 
has not been adequately performed in three situations. Due diligence is clearly 
insufficient in those situations: (a) where “red flags” suggesting inaccurate 
registration information were not pursued adequately; (b) where those 
conducting the due diligence did not critically analyze and evaluate the 
information at their disposal; or (c) where reliable, independent, outside 
sources of information were not contacted for the purpose of challenging, 
supporting, and verifying the information provided by company 
management.82  
As noted above, underwriter due diligence investigations typically begin 
with inquiries into the nature of the issuer’s business, including an 
investigation of the nature of the industry in which the issuer is involved, and 
with discussions with the issuer’s management. During these discussions, 
management usually provides the underwriter with information that 
management believes should appear in the registration statement. These 
discussions are helpful to the extent that they enable the underwriter to gain a 
                                                                                                            
81.  Escott v. BarChris, 283 F.Supp. 643, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
82.  See, e.g., Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 372-73  (2d Cir. 1973); In 
re Int’l Rectifier, 1997 WL 529600 at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 1997); Weinberger v. 
Jackson, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18394 at *6-9 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 1990); Univ. Hill 
Found. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 422 F. Supp. 879, 898-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Feit v. 
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 582 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); BarChris, 
283 F. Supp. at 696-97. See also Jack C. Auspitz & Daniel W. Levy, A Litigator’s View of Due 
Diligence Obligations, 30 S&P’S REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 215 (1997); Dennis Block 
& John Hoff, Underwriter Due Diligence in Securities Offerings, N.Y.L.J., May 27, 1999, at 5. 
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general understanding of the issuer’s business and to assess whether 
management is capable of carrying out its prospective goals.  
A due diligence investigation should not end with the receipt of 
information from management just described. For a due diligence 
investigation to be adequate, the banks performing the due diligence must 
independently verify that the information has been given. 83 Courts have 
recognized that independent verification is a critical step in the due diligence 
process.84 
Underwriters will also examine the issuer’s current financial health and its 
future financial prospects as part of their due diligence investigation. This step 
necessarily involves a review of the issuer’s financial statements which, in 
turn, requires underwriters to refer to the analysis and opinions of the issuer’s 
independent auditors. Underwriters should nevertheless carefully scrutinize 
the auditor’s report and letters to management to determine whether potential 
problem areas were uncovered during the audit. Moreover, underwriters 
should look at general financial issues—including profits and revenue, budget 
concerns, and the internal audit controls the issuer has in place—to reach a 
sufficient comfort level with the issuer’s overall financial condition. In 
addition, underwriters will address various legal issues that could potentially 
affect the accuracy of the registration statement and the adequacy of its 
disclosures.  
It is well-established that bankers whose investigations are deficient are 
not entitled to take refuge in a due diligence defense. The reasonableness 
required of underwriters’ due diligence investigations also depends upon the 
                                                                                                            
83.  See, e.g., Chris-Craft Indus., 480 F.2d 341, 372-73; Int’l Rectifier, 1997 WL 529600 at *7-8; 
Weinberger, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18394 at *6-9; Univ. Hill Found., 422 F. Supp. 879, 898-
99; Feit, 332 F. Supp. 544, 582; BarChris, 283 F. Supp. at 696-97. 
84.  For example, the court in BarChris based its determination that the underwriters had not 
established a due diligence defense in large part on the fact that the lead underwriter 
delegated much of its diligence responsibility to counsel—who merely took documents 
produced by the issuer and statements made by the issuer at face value, without any  
independent verification. 283 F. Supp. at 697. Similarly, the court in University Hill 
Foundation v. Goldman, Sachs & Co. concluded that when an underwriter possesses 
information that may indicate potential problems with the offering materials, its “normal 
due diligence procedures [are] inadequate and . . . require more concrete verification of 
management representations and projections.”  422 F. Supp. at 902. See also Chris-Craft, 
480 F.2d at 372-73 (noting that minutes from the issuer’s board meeting in underwriter’s 
possession “if not sufficient in themselves to lead a reasonable person to believe that the 
registration statement was misleading, certainly would have impelled a reasonable person 
to explore further”).  
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type of materials that they are reviewing. 85 The responsibilities of those 
conducting due diligence requires that banks do more than simply review an 
auditor’s audit opinion. For example, the Seventh Circuit, in Sanders v. John 
Nuveen & Co., pointed out that the banks performing the due diligence did 
not meet with the auditors or review the accounting work papers which might 
have revealed evidence of fraud between the issuer and the auditors. 86 
Significantly, unaudited financial statements are not considered to be 
expertised, requiring underwriters to conduct a reasonable investigation 
whenever the financial statements they are dealing with in the course of their 
due diligence have not been audited.  
Underwriters commonly delegate certain aspects of due diligence 
investigations to others, such as attorneys, accountants, and the lead 
underwriter. Relying on others to conduct certain aspects of diligence, 
however, risks preventing the underwriter from being able to establish a due 
diligence defense. For this reason, an underwriter ought not to rely blindly on 
                                                                                                            
85.  Specifically, section 11(b)(3)(A)-(D) of the Securities Act of 1933 divides the contents of 
the registration statement into two clearly-delineated portions—“non-expertised” 
materials and “expertised” materials. Securities Act of 1933, § 11(b)(3)(A)-(D), 15 U.S.C. § 
77k(b)(3)(A)-(D) (2000). Underwriters seeking to establish a due diligence defense as to 
the “non-expertised” portions of the registration statement (that is, materials “not 
purporting to be made on the authority of an expert”) must prove that, at the time of the 
registration’s effective date, they had “reasonable grounds to believe and did believe . . . 
that the statements therein were true and that there was no omission to state a material 
fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not 
misleading.” 15 U.S.C. §  77k(b)(3)(A). 
 Underwriters can establish a due diligence defense as to “expertised” portions of the 
registration statement (that is, “[those portions] made on the authority of an expert”) by 
demonstrating that after a “reasonable investigation” they had “no reasonable ground to 
believe and did not believe . that the statements [contained in the expertised section] were 
untrue or that [they omitted] a material fact.”  15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(B)-(C).  
 Accordingly, the issue with regard to the expertised portions is not “reasonable 
investigation,” but “reasonable reliance”—the underwriter must not have uncovered any 
facts that would give it a reason not to rely on an expert’s representations. Reports of 
auditors on audited financial statements of the issuer are examples of “expertised” 
opinions upon which underwriters typically rely. See, e.g.,  In re Software Toolworks, Inc. 
Sec. Litig., 789 F. Supp. 1489, 1498 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (“Given the complexity of the 
accounting issues, the Underwriters were entitled to rely on [the auditor’s] expertise.”). See 
also Miller v. Pezzani (In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig.), 35 F.3d 1407, 1421 (9th Cir. 
1994). Only the audited, certified financial statements are “expertised” for section 11 
purposes. See BarChris, 283 F. Supp. 643, 683-84; See also Phillips v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 
933 F. Supp. 303, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 108 F.3d 1370 (2d Cir. 1997), finding that 
underwriters may not always rely on auditors.  
86.  Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d 1222, 1227-28 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 
U.S. 1005 (1981).  
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the people to whom it delegates responsibility. Rather, monitoring the entire 
due diligence process—even those aspects that are delegated—is necessary to 
ensure that an underwriter’s agents will more likely conduct an adequate 
investigation, thus protecting the underwriter from liability while decreasing 
the time it takes to complete the investigation.87  
The point of this description of the due diligence process is to illustrate 
how companies subject themselves to monitoring by outsiders when they 
decide to go public. Unfortunately, a variety of factors are conspiring to 
reduce the incentives of firms to go public. First, while civil liability is 
necessary to provide incentives for investment banks and other gatekeepers to 
monitor, where liability is imposed willy-nilly, without regard to the efforts 
made by investment banks to investigate, firms will respond by declining to 
go public or by selling their shares far less frequently.88 This in turn results in 
less interaction between the company and its gatekeepers, with a concomitant 
reduction in monitoring, leading, in turn, to a diminution in the quality of 
corporate governance for the firm.   
As Frank Easterbrook has explained, we observe the strange 
phenomenon of companies simultaneously disbursing cash to investors by 
paying dividends and raising cash from investors by making initial public 
                                                                                                            
87.   See BarChris, 283 F. Supp. at 696-97 (attorney’s failure to adequately examine corporate 
minutes and contracts binding on underwriters). See, e.g., Dannenberg v. Painewebber Inc. 
(In re Software Toolworks Sec. Litig.), 50 F.3d 615, 625-26 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding it 
inadequate for underwriters to rely on a company's assurances as to its financial condition 
where the underwriters had access to all available information); see also Obligations of 
Underwriters, Brokers and Dealers in Distributing and Trading Securities, Securities Act 
Release No. 33-5275, [Securities Act/Exchange Act Binder Vol. 2] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 4506B at 4057 (July 26, 1972) (noting that reliance on the managing underwriter 
is reasonable if the participating underwriter is satisfied that “the managing underwriter 
ma[de] the kind of investigation that the participant would have performed if it were the 
manager,” and that “the manager’s program of investigation and actual investigative 
performance are adequate.”). 
88.  The seminal article on the effect of underwriters’ civil liability on the new issues market is 
Michael P. Dooley, The Effects of Civil Liability on Investment Banking and the New Issues 
Market, 58 VA. L. REV. 776 (1972). When prices go up, demand goes down. Since 
increased risk of liability is, from the issuers’ point of view, part of the anticipated price of 
going public, when the risk of liability goes up, the demand by issuers to make public 
offerings will decline. Over-imposing of civil liability on securities underwriters creates 
other inefficiencies in the public offerings market, see, e.g., Seha M. Tahic, Anatomy of 
Initial Public Offerings of Common Stock, 43 J. Fin. 789, 790 (1988) (discussing empirical 
evidence suggesting that “gross underpricing [of IPOs] serves as an efficient form of 
protection against legal liabilities . . . [i]n other words, it is a form of implicit insurance 
against potential liabilities that may arise from the ‘due diligence’ and disclosure 
requirements of the federal securities regulations.”).  
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offerings of equity on the same class of securities.89 The best explanation for 
this apparently odd behavior is that it is in investors’ interests for companies 
to submit themselves regularly to the monitoring function of the due 
diligence process associated with initial public offerings.  
From this perspective, the recent changes in the tax code that 
dramatically reduce the tax rates on dividend payments can be viewed as 
strengthening the corporate governance infrastructure in the U.S. by 
removing an impediment to paying dividends.90 This reduction, however, is 
scheduled to expire. 91  The reduction should be made permanent, and 
additional regulatory changes should be implemented to encourage companies 
to make regular offerings of their equity securities in public offerings.  
 
F.  The Securities and Exchange Commission 
  
The SEC is playing an increasingly active role in corporate governance. 
For example, in late 2005, the SEC put three high-profile corporate directors 
on notice that the Commission was considering filing suit against them for 
failing to spot fraud by Conrad M. Black at Hollinger Corporation. The three 
executives, James R. Thompson, Richard R. Burt, and Marie-Josée Kravis, 
constituted the audit committee of Hollinger’s board of directors from 1998 
to October 2003.92  
 As the New York Times reported in its account of the SEC’s activities,  
 
                                                                                                            
89. Frank H. Easterbrook, supra note 77, at 650-51.  
90.  Historically, dividends were taxed as ordinary income, at rates as high as 38.6 percent. The 
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA) of 2003 reduced the taxes on 
dividends received from U.S. companies, certain mutual funds, and so-called “qualified” 
foreign corporations (generally those incorporated in a U.S. possession, eligible for 
benefits under a U.S. tax treaty that meets certain criteria or readily traded on an 
established U.S. exchange as stock or an ADR) to fifteen percent for most taxpayers. For 
lower income individuals, the tax rate on dividends drops to five percent, decreasing to 
zero percent in 2008. These new, lower rates of fifteen percent and five percent are 
effective for dividends received beginning January 2003 and are scheduled to expire 
beginning in 2009. 
91.  Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, §§ 1-117 
Stat 501, 752 (2003). 
92.  James R. Thompson is a former governor of Illinois and a partner with the law firm of 
Winston & Strawn; Richard R. Burt is a former United States ambassador to Germany; 
and Marie-Josee Kravis is the spouse of financier Henry R. Kravis and a member of the 
boards of the Ford Motor Company and IAC/InterActive Corp.  
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[i]f the S.E.C. does file a civil suit against Mr. Thompson, 
Mr. Burt and Mrs. Kravis, it would be an unusual attempt 
to hold independent directors to account for not being 
vigilant enough about a suspected fraud. None of the three 
directors received any of the money from payments that 
are the subject of various actions against the Hollinger co-
founder Conrad M. Black and his associates.”93  
 
An internal report by a special committee of Hollinger’s board written 
under the direction of Richard C. Breeden, a former SEC chairman, said that 
the audit committee was characterized by an “inexplicable and nearly 
complete lack of initiative, diligence or independent thought” which led to 
“self-righteous and aggressive looting” of the company.94 
The SEC’s aggressive pursuit of these directors in a civil action clearly 
illustrates the Commission’s shift from its traditional role of policing the 
capital markets and promoting full disclosure by public companies to its new, 
if unauthorized, role of corporate governance watchdog.95 The SEC has 
found that corporate governance pays. Despite the deficiencies in the 
Commission’s own corporate governance, 96  and its lack of success in 
regulating, the SEC in recent years has been hugely rewarded in the only two 
ways that matter for regulatory agencies: massive budget increases and 
significant new powers.  
The Commission’s performance can most charitably be characterized as 
anemic in every aspect of its mission during the wave of scandals that rocked 
corporate America and Wall Street. The SEC failed to anticipate or to deal 
decisively with the wave of corporate governance scandals—such as, inter 
alia, Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, Adelphia, Tyco, Waste 
Management, and Sunbeam. The SEC similarly failed to regulate in its own 
core areas of expertise—disclosure and capital market regulation—as 
evidenced by the mutual fund market timing and late trading scandals, the 
                                                                                                            
93.  Richard Siklos, S.E.C. Puts Three Hollinger Directors on Notice, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2005, at 
C1.  
94.  Id. at C2. 
95.  See Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (litigation related to SEC 
attempt to bar securities exchanges from listing corporations that reduced the per share 
voting rights of already existing common share holders).  
96.  See Stephen Taub, GAO Criticizes SEC Internal Controls, CFO.COM, Nov. 23, 2005, 
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/5213245?f=home_breakingnews. (last visited Apr. 11, 
2006). 
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scandals involving securities analysts’ conflicts of interest, spinning and 
laddering of initial public offerings, and the breakdown in the corporate 
governance of the securities exchanges. In each of these areas, the SEC was 
motivated to act not on its own initiative, but in pallid response to the more 
energetic activities of the New York Attorney General, Elliott Spitzer.  
Despite its failures, the SEC’s budget more than doubled during the 
period from 2001-2004, increasing from $422.8 million to $913 million. The 
SEC also received a sizeable $100 million budget increase in fiscal year 2003. 
Although the SEC was not the only agency to receive a budget increase 
during this period, the Commission was the only federal agency to receive 
substantial budget increases in both 2003 and 2004.97 Testifying before the 
House Subcommittee on Science, Department of State, Justice, and 
Commerce; and Related Agencies, then-SEC Chairman William Donaldson 
said President George W. Bush’s request for $841.5 million in fiscal 2004 
“recognizes that the Commission’s needs are growing and ongoing.”98 That 
funding, which was provided to the SEC, would, according to Donaldson 
“enable us to meet the remaining fast-approaching deadlines of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, hire over 800 new staff [and] advance initial start-up funds to the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.”99 The 2005 budget request of 
$893 million for the SEC, an increase of $81 million, was ten percent above 
the 2004 level.100 The President’s FY 2004 budget for the SEC was the largest 
increase in the history of the agency, nearly doubling the SEC budget over FY 
2002 levels. The resources were used to hire new accountants, lawyers, and 
examiners “to protect investors and combat corporate wrongdoing.”101  
                                                                                                            
97.  Susan Dudley & Melinda Warren, Regulatory Spending Soars: An Analysis of the U.S. Budget for 
Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004, 2004 Annual Report 14-19 (July 2003), available at  
http://wc.wustl.edu/Reg_Budget_final.pdf. 
98.  William H. Donaldson, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Testimony Concerning 
Appropriations for Fiscal 2004 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, State, and 
the Judiciary of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, (Mar. 13, 2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/031303tswhd.htm. 
99.  Id. 
100. Actually, the SEC’s FY 2005 budget request to Congress totaled $913 million and was 
12.5 percent above the amount authorized for the SEC in fiscal 2004. The amount 
consisted of $893 million in new budget authority and $20 million in anticipated balances 
from the prior year. This budget request—the first crafted by Chairman Donaldson since 
his arrival in February 2003— permitted the Commission to hire 106 new employees. 
Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Releases FY 2005 Budget 
Information, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-11.htm. 
101.  Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Restoring Economic Confidence 
and Tackling Corporate Fraud (Jan. 11, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
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As I have observed before, these huge budget increases were strongly 
supported by the Investment Company Institute (ICI)102 and the Securities 
Industry Association, (SIA), 103  which are the principal interest groups 
representing, respectively, the mutual fund industry and the securities 
industry.104  
In 2001, SEC staff received the largest pay increases of any administrative 
agency in the U.S. government when Congress enacted the Pay Parity Act.105 
The House Committee on Financial Services voted to increase the SEC’s pay 
at its first markup session, elevating SEC staff members to the same pay scale 
as employees of the Federal Reserve Board and the Comptroller of the 
Currency.106 
From a corporate governance perspective, these gigantic budget increases 
and large pay raises seem highly anomalous to say the least. For most 
observers, the SEC’s performance was dismal.107 New York Attorney General 
Eliot Spitzer even observed, “heads should roll” at the SEC for its failure to 
detect and act upon abuses in the mutual fund industry and elsewhere.108 This 
criticism, of course, seems highly inconsistent with the increases in pay and 
power that characterize Congress’s response to the SEC’s failures.  
More generally, as I have observed previously: 
 
                                                                                                            
 news/releases/2003/01/20030111-1.html (last visited July 24, 2004).  
102.  Press Release, Investment Company Institute, ICI Supports Bush SEC Budget Proposal 
(Jan. 6, 2003), available at http://www.ici.org/statements/nr/2003 
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SEC Budget: Well-Funded Regulator is Key to Building Public Trust and Confidence in 
Capital Markets, (Feb. 4, 2003) (on file with author). 
104.  Jonathan R. Macey, Positive Political Theory and Federal Usurpation of the Regulation of Corporate 
Governance: The Coming Pre-emption of the Martin Act, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 951, 968 
nn.51-52 (2005). 
105.  Investor and Capital Markets Fee Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 107-123, 115 Stat. 2390 (2002). 
106.  Id. at 2398. see also U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, PAY PARITY 
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN AND REPORT (Mar. 6, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies 
        /payparity.htm. (last visited Apr. 11, 2006). 
107.  John C. Coffee Jr., A Course of Inaction: Where Was the SEC When the Mutual Fund Scandal 
Happened?, 2004-APR LEGAL AFF. 46, 49 (2004) (discussing the SEC’s passivity with 
regard to the mutual fund crisis); Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and 
Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909, 948-49 
(1994). 
108. Senators Slam SEC in Funds Scandal, CBS NEWS, Nov. 3, 2003, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/11/04/national/main581683.shtml (last visited 
Apr. 11, 2006). see also Senators Blast SEC Over Mutual Fund Scandal, USA TODAY,  Nov. 3, 
2003, http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/funds/2003-11-03-fund-hearing_x.htm. 
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Firms that are subject to market forces at best shrink and 
sometimes shrivel and die when they under-perform. In 
other words, the market punishes rather than rewards 
failure in the private sector. The recent spate of scandals, 
particularly among mutual funds and market analysts, can 
hardly be viewed as a success story for the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. In case it were needed, this recent 
wave of scandals can be viewed as additional evidence that 
administrative agencies are not subject to the same 
Darwinian pressures as firms in the private sector. . . . 
[T]he crisis of confidence in U.S. capital markets was 
clearly beneficial to the SEC in general.109  
 
The unwarranted budget expansion and pay increases at the SEC are yet 
another example of the increasing politicization of institutions of corporate 
governance, a process which has richly rewarded poor performance. 
Whatever one might say about the increases in salary and power enjoyed 
by the SEC, these changes most emphatically do not represent pay for 
performance. At best, one can say that the SEC, like the accounting industry 
and the credit rating agencies, is being rewarded in spite of its failure to 
protect investors or to promote the public interest. 
 
II.  INSTITUTIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
PAY FOR NON-PERFORMANCE 
  
In the preceding section, we reviewed six of the most important 
institutions that constitute the U.S. corporate governance infrastructure. The 
most effective of these institutions, the market for corporate control, has 
been stifled by regulations that shift the balance of power away from bidders 
and target firm shareholders and towards incumbent management. Another 
effective corporate governance tool, the initial public offering, is seldom used 
because of litigation risk and regulatory burdens.  
Regulations have transformed other institutional features of the corporate 
governance landscape. Specifically, accounting firms, credit rating agencies, 
and stock exchanges used to play a large and useful role in the governance of 
publicly-held firms. Over time, however, regulation has undermined the 
                                                                                                            
109.  Jonathan R. Macey, Wall Street in Turmoil: State-Federal Relations Post-Eliot Spitzer, 70 BROOK. 
L. REV. 117, 120-121 (2004). 
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effectiveness of these institutions as well. Where there used to be market-
driven demand for the services of auditors, rating agencies, and organized 
stock exchange, the demand for these services is now a construct of complex 
regulatory regimes that not only require public companies to purchase the 
services generated by these firms, but effectively cartelize the industries that 
provide these services. In the case of accounting firms and credit rating 
agencies, regulators have cartelized the industry by erecting barriers to entry 
that limit to a handful the number of firms that can compete to provide these 
services. In the case of the organized stock exchanges, regulations not only 
dramatically restrict entry, they also limit competition and innovation by 
coordinating the internal governance rules of the exchanges.  
Hovering somewhere above this complex and depressing picture is the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, which has been generously rewarded 
for its own non-performance. Responding to political pressure, the SEC has 
pressed for changes in corporate governance rules that are both costly and 
ineffectual, but that help the SEC to expand its own constituency. The new 
rules regarding expanding shareholders’ access to the corporate election 
machinery and the governance of mutual funds both fit this description. They 
purport to be devices aimed at improving corporate governance, but in fact, 
they are likely to be highly ineffectual. 
 
A. The SEC’s Shareholder Access Proposal 
 
In 2003, the SEC proposed Rule 14a-11, which represents a major change 
in the ability of outsiders to gain access to corporate voting machinery. 110 If 
enacted, this rule would permit qualifying outside shareholders to require the 
corporations in which they own shares to place their nominee on the 
corporation’s ballot along side the company’s own nominees.111 Companies 
subject to the rule also would be required to publish the nominee’s 
supporting statement. 
                                                                                                            
110.  Security Holder Director Nominations, Concept Release No. 34-4826, 68 Fed. Reg. 60, 
784 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003).  
111.  Only shareholders who meet four criteria will have access to the company’s proxy 
materials. The four criteria for such shareholders are: (a) beneficial ownership of more 
than five percent of the company’s voting stock, held continuously for at least two years; 
(b) declaration of intent to continue owning the requisite number of securities through the 
date of the relevant shareholders’ meeting; (c) eligibility to report their holdings on 
Schedule 13G rather than 13D; and (d) filing of a Schedule 13G before their nomination 
is submitted to the corporation. Id.  
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The rule would give shareholder groups this access to the corporate 
proxy machinery only if one of two triggering events were to occur. The first 
triggering event is majority shareholder approval of a shareholder proposal to 
authorize shareholder nominations that has been placed on the ballot under 
SEC Rule 14a-8.112 The second triggering event is the casting of thirty-five 
percent or more of the total votes in a corporate election by shareholders 
electing to withhold proxy authority from the incumbent board of 
directors.113 If one of these two triggering events occurs, then at the following 
annual meeting at which directors are to be elected, shareholder nominees 
must be included in the company’s ballot and accompanying proxy 
statement.114 As I have observed before, this ineffectual proposal reflects the 
SEC’s “desperate attempt to regain control of the regulatory agenda”115 in the 
field of capital markets regulation.  
The SEC could, if it were so inclined, enact voting rules that improved 
the quality of corporate governance by reducing the ability of incumbent 
managers to bypass shareholders’ efforts to vote on management proposals 
such as poison pills that impede the market for corporate control. Specifically, 
the SEC has withheld vigorous support of the shareholder rights by-law, 
which would allow investors to enact corporate bylaws requiring directors to 
permit shareholders to vote on the issue of whether a company should nullify 
anti-takeover devices such as the poison pill, when a company receives a fully 
funded cash takeover bid for all of its outstanding shares at a substantial 
premium to market.116  
Along these lines, the explicit provisions in the SEC’s proposed rules that 
make it impossible for shareholders to replace a majority of incumbent 
directors are critical to understanding the SEC’s proposal regarding director 
nominations. According to the proposal, any candidate nominated by the 
shareholders must be an independent director under listing standards 
applicable to the issuer and must also be independent of the shareholders that 
nominate him or her. This means that a nominee, no matter how much 
support she has from the shareholders, cannot be affiliated with an outside 
group seeking to gain control of the board. Moreover, only one candidate can 
                                                                                                            
112.  Id. 
113.  Id.  
114.  Id.  
115.  Jonathan R. Macey, Securities and Exchange Nanny, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 2003, at A10. 
116.  See Jonathan R. Macey, The Legality and Utility of the Shareholder Rights Bylaw, 26 HOFSTRA L. 
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be nominated if the board has fewer than nine members.117 Two candidates 
may be nominated if the board is composed of nine to nineteen directors and 
votes are withheld from two management nominees. 118  The number of 
nominees increases to a maximum of three if the board is composed of 
twenty or more directors and votes are withheld from three management 
nominees.119 Thus, under the SEC’s proposal, shareholders can only replace 
two-ninths of the board, far less than the majority necessary for control. And 
even this pale version of a control contest is diminished further by the fact 
that it takes two election cycles before any shareholder nominees can be 
elected because one election is necessary in order to obtain the votes 
necessary to trigger an election the following year. The time lag extends still 
further because shareholders and shareholder groups must have held over 
five percent of the issuer’s securities for at least two years to nominate a 
candidate for the board.120  
Thus, the SEC’s proposed rule cannot be construed as bolstering the 
faltering market for corporate control, because it cannot be used to facilitate a 
control transaction. Rather, as I have previously observed, the SEC’s 
proposed new rule is a “poorly disguised attempt [by the SEC] to link itself to 
a new constituency: public interest pension funds and other ‘activist’ 
shareholder groups, whose preferences and agendas are unlikely to reflect the 
profit-maximization motive that is embraced by the average investor.”121 
 
B. SEC Mutual Fund Board Chairman Independence Rule 
  
In another example of the new, post-Enron SEC, on June 23, 2004, by a 
vote of three to two, the SEC voted to require that the chairs of mutual 
funds’ boards of directors be independent of the advisors of such funds.122 
Commissioner Cynthia A. Glassman commented on the complete lack of 
empirical or theoretical justification for this proposal: 
 
                                                                                                            
117.  Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. at 60,797. 
118.  Id. 
119.  Id. 60,797-98 
120.  Id. at 60,799.  
121.  Macey, supra note 109, at 136. 
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It is a fact that many of the top-rated funds today based on 
high performance and low fees have inside chairs. Why 
should we tell shareholders they can no longer have the 
form of governance that produced this high level of 
performance? And further, why should we require them to 
pay for it? There can be no doubt that this requirement 
will add to fund expenses. An independent chair cannot be 
expected to have—and in most cases, will not have—
hands-on knowledge about fund operations. Therefore, to 
be effective, the chair would have to hire a staff. 
Shareholders will bear that expense as well as the likely 
additional cost of the independent chairman. In sum, the 
benefits are illusory, but the costs are real.123 
 
Commissioner Glassman also noted the lack of empirical evidence for the 
assumption, inherent in this rule, that mutual funds with independent chairs 
have either higher returns or lower overhead and administrative costs than 
mutual funds chaired by insiders:124 
 
As with the SEC’s proposed shareholder ballot-access 
rule, it appears that in promulgating the chairman 
independence rule, the Commission is clearly less 
concerned with shareholder welfare and the quality of U.S. 
capital markets than it has been in the past. The public 
interest concern with the quality of U.S. investors and 
capital markets appears to have been replaced by a 
regulatory agenda that includes rulemaking oriented 
towards special-interest groups.125  
  
In the post-Enron world, the SEC, always a political support-maximizing 
bureaucracy, is guided by political considerations, not policy considerations in 
its determination of what new corporate governance rules should be 
promulgated and in determining how its existing rules should be enforced. 
                                                                                                            
123.  Cynthia A. Glassman, Statement by SEC Commissioner Regarding Investment Company 
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Rather than use its interpretive and regulatory powers to promulgate 
regulations that improve the functioning of the market for corporate control 
or encourage initial public offerings, the SEC has chosen to allocate its 
resources towards cosmetic measures, like shareholder ballot access and 
independent board chairs for mutual funds. The only bottom line that will be 




The SEC’s success in procuring more resources, in the form of higher 
budget allocations, does not necessarily mean that the SEC’s power and 
prestige have increased in the wake of the corporate scandals that have 
rocked Wall Street. Also, the SEC’s budget increases do not reflect 
heightened public recognition of the SEC’s relevance or effectiveness. Rather, 
the SEC’s success in the budgetary process reflects the need for federal 
officials to appear to be “doing something” in the wake of the crises that have 
emerged on Main Street (e.g., Enron, Global Crossing, Adelphia, Tyco, Waste 
Management, and Sunbeam) and in the wake of the scandals that the SEC’s 
main rival, Eliot Spitzer, has uncovered on Wall Street (e.g., financial analysts 
and market timers at mutual funds).  
As an economic matter, corporate governance rules can be categorized as 
either effective or ineffective. As a political matter, corporate governance 
rules can be categorized as either favored or disfavored. Strikingly, this article 
has shown that those corporate governance rules that seem to be most 
favored in the political realm are precisely those rules that are least effective in 
practice. By contrast, those corporate governance rules that are the most 
effective, as measured by the extent to which they reduce agency costs and 
enhance shareholder wealth, are those that are least favored in the realm of 
politics. These observations do not bode well for the future of the U.S. 
economy. 
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Spending authority  
(thousands) 
Actual obligations  
(thousands) 
Annual increase in 
budget authority 
1990 $ 166,633 $ 165,211  --- 
1991 $ 189,083  $ 187,689  13.5 % 
1992 $ 225,792  $ 224,281  19.4 % 
1993 $ 253,235  $ 251,871  12.2 % 
1994 $ 269,150   $ 266,249  6.3 % 
1995 $ 300,437  $ 284,755  11.6 % 
1996 $ 300,921  $ 296,533  0.2 % 
1997 $ 311,100  $ 308,591  3.4 % 
1998 $ 315,000  $ 311,143  1.3 % 
1999 $ 341,574  $ 338,887  8.4 % 
2000 $ 377,000  $ 369,825  10.4 % 
2001 $ 422,800  $ 412,618  12.1 % 
2002 $ 513,989  $ 487,345  21.6 % 
2003 $ 716,350  $ 619,321  39.4 % 
2004 $ 811,500  $ 755,012  13.3 % 
2005 $ 913,000 $ 887,227 12.5 % 
 
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Frequently Requested FOIA Document: SEC Budget 
History vs. Actual Expenses, http://www.sec.gov/foia/docs/budgetact.htm (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2006). 
 
 
